Western Washington University

Western CEDAR
History Faculty and Staff Publications

History

2015

The Wire: Progress, Paradox, and Disaster in the Strategic
Networking of China, 1881–1901
Roger R. Thompson
Western Washington University, roger.thompson@wwu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://cedar.wwu.edu/history_facpubs
Part of the Asian History Commons

Recommended Citation
Thompson, Roger R., "The Wire: Progress, Paradox, and Disaster in the Strategic Networking of China,
1881–1901" (2015). History Faculty and Staff Publications. 82.
https://cedar.wwu.edu/history_facpubs/82

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the History at Western CEDAR. It has been accepted for
inclusion in History Faculty and Staff Publications by an authorized administrator of Western CEDAR. For more
information, please contact westerncedar@wwu.edu.

Front. Hist. China 2015, 10(3): 395–427
DOI 10.3868/s020-004-015-0020-0

FORUM

Roger R. Thompson

The Wire: Progress, Paradox, and Disaster in the
Strategic Networking of China, 1881–1901
Abstract This study of the introduction of telegraphy to China in the
late-nineteenth century tells three interrelated stories: China’s pursuit of
telegraphic sovereignty with its strategic networking of the empire in the period
1881–99; the functioning of China’s hybrid express courier-telegraphic
communications infrastructure; and the international communications crisis
during the Boxer Uprising and the “Siege of the Legations” in 1900. The material
reality of two inter-connected networks—the privately owned Imperial Telegraph
Administration network and the government-run telegraph network—allowed
Qing-era Beijing and its provincial governors to communicate with much greater
speed. The materiality of these networks—how this new communications
technology affected the practical realities of government communications,
including the ease of lateral communications between provincial governors—is
explored in the context of the communications crisis of 1900. In May and June of
1900 all telegraph lines to Beijing, and throughout much of North China, were
cut or otherwise destroyed. While these blinded Western governments are no
longer able to exchange telegrams with their Beijing-based envoys, the Qing
express courier system continued to operate. Moreover, both the court and
provincial officials quickly improvised ad hoc telegraphic communication
protocols through the use of “transfer telegrams” (zhuandian) that relied on
mounted express couriers between Beijing and those North China telegraph
stations with working network connections. This assessment of real-time secret
imperial communications between the Qing court and the provinces is based on
the documentary register Suishou dengji (Records of [documents] at hand)
maintained by communications managers in the Grand Council. China lost its
telegraphic sovereignty in the capital region when Allied troops occupied the
Beijing-Tianjin line of communications in the summer and fall of 1900.
Moreover, Western dreams of laying, landing, and controlling submarine cables
on the China coast were finally realized in North China by the end of 1900. The
British, therefore, were able to add a critical section to their planned global
network of secure telegraphic communications. China’s recognition of the
Western and Japanese right of protecting the Beijing-Tianjin line of
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communications was codified in Article 9 of the Boxer Protocol of September
1901. These losses of China’s telegraphic sovereignty would not be completely
reversed until after 1949.
Keywords telegraph, submarine cables, Imperial Telegraph Administration,
Zongli Yamen, Suishou dengji, Boxer Uprising, Li Hongzhang, Zhang Zhidong

Introduction
In the dark of night on December 8, 1870 a submarine cable from Hong Kong
was landed at Shanghai. Without fanfare, or Qing government permission, a
fringe of China’s territory was now linked by wire to Europe. But there the
telegraph line ended, not to be extended until 1881, when Qing authorities built a
line north to Tianjin. Spurred in part by increasing foreign threats to all frontier
regions, most of China’s strategic communications network was completed in
about fifteen years of methodical construction. In the first six years of this
construction, telegraphy came to the capitals of most of China’s maritime
provinces, most of the Yangzi provinces, and two provinces in
Manchuria—eleven provincial capitals in all. In the next six years (1887–92) the
network reached nine more provincial capitals in the southwest, northwest, and
northeast. In the final years of the nineteenth century the far northwest and
Mongolia were connected, and the line to Tibet, via Sichuan, was started. In 1897,
with the addition of Hunan’s Changsha, all of China’s provincial capitals were
part of a telegraph network that remained centered where it began: Shanghai.
China achieved this empire-wide telegraphic sovereignty at precisely the
moment when it was forced to cede territorial sovereignty from the Manchurian
coast in the northeast to the border with French Indochina in the south. In the
final years of the nineteenth century, as events began to spin out of control, these
intertwining narratives of the enhancing of Qing governmentality, and the
encroaching demands of imperialism, open new windows of understanding on
the Self-strengthening Era in general and the troubled events of 1900 in particular.
Moreover, a third narrative of the global competition to build secure lines of
telegraphic communication between metropoles and colonies takes us to the
coast of China. We can see evidence that what was at stake in the “scramble for
China” in 1897–1900 was not so much Chinese territory itself, but rather East
Asian sectors of a global communications network.
The wires, poles, and buildings—some of the material parts of
communications infrastructure—are just the starting points of analysis; webbing
the world with wire strung or laid across vast distances was but the first
marvelous step in creating an international telegraph network. The wires became
a network circling a globe of nation-states, territories, and oceans through the
agency of states and societies alike. The wire’s physical reality was uniform, but
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its materiality—how its use in specific situations was “formed by technological,
ideological, physical, economic, legal, political, and other determinants”1—could
be as diverse as the lands it traversed. In our study of Qing China’s adoption and
use of telegraphy in the late-nineteenth century, then, we should do more than
simply add another chapter to a world history of a nineteenth-century
communications revolution that focusses on the material reality of the wire.
Rather, we must document and analyze the materiality of the telegraph in China.
Once we know how a telegraphic message from the Forbidden City reached a
provincial governor through the wire, we need to look at the forces—cultural,
economic, political, military—that affected the use of telegraphy in China.
What, exactly, did the wire mean to state and society in Qing China? Did
telegraphy affect the Qing dynasty’s communications protocols and the effective
reach of Beijing? Did it alter the power of provincial governors and their
relationships with one another? Did telegraphy influence the local communities
through which its lines ran?2 Did this information infrastructure—its wires and
messages—affect how the “world” was viewed and conceptualized? If we follow
the lead of Susan Star and consider the ethnography of infrastructure, can we
view a telegraph network and its messages, for example, as artifacts, as traces or
records of activities, and a representation of a world?3 It is true that all of the
world’s diversity was being represented as pulses—the dots and dashes of Morse
code—of modulated electrical energy that moved around the world according to
international standards established at European-led conventions held in the
late-nineteenth century. But this uniformity obscured the diverse materialities of
the international telegraph network.
China followed the example of the United States and Russia, two other
countries of vast continental spaces. Russia had relied on a Danish company and
foreign capital; the United States relied, for the most part, on private companies.
The Qing dynasty, advised by the powerful reform-minded official Li Hongzhang,
decided on a third model: a joint government-private effort with no foreign
investment. After an initial period of technology transfer aided by the same
Danish company that worked with Russia, China achieved a technical capability
that minimized the role played by foreign experts.4 Although China’s territorial
1

Bill Brown, “Materiality,” 59.
I thank Dr. Wook Yoon, who wrote a ground-breaking Yale dissertation “The Grand Council
and the Communication Systems in the Late Qing” that included a chapter on telegraphy. See
also his essay “Dashed Expectations: Limitations of the Telegraphic Service in the Late Qing,”
Modern Asian Studies, vol. 49, no. 3, 2015, 832–57. Dr. Yoon’s collegial and generous
responses to my questions about the Qing archives and its documents have been very helpful.
3
Susan Leigh Star, “The Ethnography of Infrastructure,” 387. I thank Prof. Thomas Mullaney
for bringing Star’s work to my attention.
4
Jorma Ahvenainen, The Far Eastern Telegraphs: The History of Telegraphic
Communications between the Far East, Europe, and America before the First World War;
Robert Luther Thompson, Wiring a Continent: The History of the Telegraph Industry in the
United States, 1832–66.
2
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sovereignty was under attack in this era of unequal treaties and telegraph
imperialism, 5 China sought and achieved “telegraphic sovereignty” (dianxin
zhuquan),6 a remarkable achievement compromised only in the context of the
Boxer Uprising of 1900.

Progress
Like many other reforms of the Self-strengthening Era, the development of
China’s telegraph network had provincial origins. Governor Ding Richang, who
had blocked British efforts to string telegraph lines in the Shanghai area in 1869,
sponsored the construction of a telegraph line in southern Taiwan in 1877.7 In
1879 Li Hongzhang connected his Tianjin government offices with the Dagu
Forts that protected the riverine approach from the Gulf of Zhili to Tianjin. A
year later, in October of 1880, he established in Tianjin the Tianjin-Shanghai
General Telegraph Bureau (Jin-Hu dianbao zongju) and in June 1881,8 with
imperial approval, crews began stringing lines to the south from Tianjin and to
the north from Shanghai. By year’s end the Tianjin-Shanghai line was
operational. The Telegraph Bureau was granted guandu shangban status
(officially-sponsored; merchant-managed) status on April 18, 1882 and renamed
the Chinese Telegraph General Bureau (Zhongguo dianbao zongju), a term
whose conventional treaty-port translation was either “Imperial Telegraph
Administration” or “Chinese Telegraph Administration.” 9 China soon took
control of its connection to the world: the Great Northern Telegraph Company’s
illegally-landed cable at Shanghai. China reminded the Danish company that
telegraph landlines were China’s sole prerogative and on May 18, 1883
ownership of this line was transferred to the privately-held Imperial Telegraph
Administration (ITA).10
This transfer took place during the first phase (1881–83) of network
construction, when the provincial capitals of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Guangdong
were connected to the Tianjin-Shanghai line. In the second phase (1884–86) lines
5

Deep Kanta Lahiri Choudhury argues in his work on telegraphy, India, and the British
empire that “the telegraph network added a significant dimension to imperialism and imperial
expansion.” See Choudhury, Telegraphic Imperialism: Crisis and Panic in the Indian Empire,
c. 1830–1912, 3.
6
Zhongguo jindai youdian shi, 71.
7
Ahvenainen, The Far Eastern Telegraphs, 43; Wang Ermin, “Sheng Xuanhuai yu Zhongguo
dianbao shiye de jingying,” 783.
8
Zhongguo jindai youdian shi, 54; see Erik Baark, Lightning Wires: The Telegraph and
China’s Technological Modernization, 1860–1890, 166 for start date.
9
See Zhongguo jindai youdian shi, 54, 61, 227; Albert Feuerwerker, China’s Early
Industrialization: Sheng Hsuan-huai (1844–1916) and Mandarin Enterprise, 191–92.
10
Baark, Lightning Wires, 173.
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reached Fengtian and Jilin; Baoding in Zhili; Shandong; Fujian; Anhui; and
Hubei and Sichuan. The third phase (1887–89) connected Heilongjiang, Guangxi,
Guizhou, Yunnan, Henan, and Jiangxi. In the fourth phase (1890–92) Shanxi,
Shaanxi, and Gansu joined the network. In the final years of the nineteenth
century Xinjiang (1893–95) and Hunan (1896–99) were wired. Also in this last
phase a line reaching across Mongolia was completed and one to Tibet, via
Sichuan, was started. 11 Thus, by century’s end China had interconnected
commercial and government telegraph networks totaling 22,000 miles in length
(the world total exceeded 600,000 miles of landlines) that reached all provincial
capitals, and many prefectures and counties. Government communications were
carried at a discount over commercial lines; government lines could carry private
telegrams.12
Chinese telegraphic sovereignty meant that this construction, either
state-sponsored or state-implemented, faced few of the obstacles, some
officially-inspired, that had frustrated early Western initiatives in telegraph
line-stringing. Looking at Hunan in particular, and China proper in general,
Zhang Zhidong, governor-general of Hubei and Hunan, wrote in a November
1891 report to Beijing about a recent incident in Hunan that he characterized as
an outlier. In nineteen other provinces, Zhang wrote, the lines went up.13 As we
will see, Zhang’s matter-of-fact assessment for at least four provinces in the
northwest would be complicated by later events, but these appear to have been
exceptional. Long before Zhang’s report reached Beijing, Shanghai’s periodical
press had covered the following dramatic events in Hunan. In the summer of
1891, two line-stringing parties operating under the authority of Zhang Zhidong
were challenged by angry, sometimes violent, crowds.14 According to Shenbao’s
Hankou correspondent, one of these events involved more than 10,000 persons
11

Chiba Masashi, Kindai kōtsū taikei to Shin Teikoku no henbō: Denshin tetsudō nettowā ku
no keisei to Chūgoku kokka tōgō no hen’yō, 65–95 (including line-construction chart at 70–80),
103–5 (provincial-capital chart). For other narratives see Ahvenainen, The Far Eastern
Telegraphs, 59–157; Zhongguo jindai youdian shi, 42–78; Feuerwerker, China’s Early
Industrialization, 191–97; Wang Ermin, “Sheng Xuanhuai yu Zhongguo dianbao shiye de
jingying,” 783–89 (line-construction chart); Wook Yoon, “The Grand Council and the
Communication Systems in the Late Qing,” 201 (table of construction costs of telegraph line
networks). See also Baark, Lightning Wires; Yongming Zhou, Historicizing Online Politics:
Telegraphy, the Internet, and Political Participation in China. In general, the telegraph
network replicated the network of imperial postal routes. For a map of the main post routes see
Ying-wan Cheng, Postal Communication in China and Its Modernization, 1860–1896, 11.
12
Zhongguo jindai youdian shi, 65; Feuerwerker, China’s Early Industrialization, 197; Daniel
R. Headrick, The Invisible Weapon: Telecommunications and International Politics,
1851–1945, 28.
13
Yangwu yundong (hereafter YWYD), vol. 6, 426.
14
North China Daily News (hereafter NCDN), August 19, 1891, 171, citing Hubao. This
Chinese-language publication was a sister publication of the North China Daily News and the
North China Herald. See Roswell S. Britton, The Chinese Periodical Press, 1800–1912, 51.
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who destroyed 2,000 poles and established “a sort of vigilance committee... to
watch over all the watercourses and creeks, to prevent foreign engineers and
telegraph materials being smuggled into the province”;15 another Shenbao report,
probably of the same incident, claimed 20,000 persons had blocked the line party,
destroying 10,000 poles.16 The second line-party left Hunan after a magistrate
said he could not promise protection. The report states: “The magistrate of the
place was compelled by threats to sign an undertaking, which was dictated to him,
not to permit the erection of telegraphs in the province.”17 Zhang Zhidong was
directed by Beijing to investigate this incident, which occurred in the regional
context of anti-foreign, secret-society-led riots that roiled the mid-Yangzi region
in 1891. In his November 1891 report Zhang explained this context, noting that
the line was being built by Sheng Xuanhuai’s ITA with foreign engineers in
Lizhou, a district northwest of Changsha and south of the Yangzi, already
experiencing anti-missionary animus. He outlined an approach to the project, one
he knew had worked elsewhere in China, that Governor Chen Baozhen would
eventually implement in 1896.18
The building of a Changsha-Hankou line took place after a Beijing-directed
change in Hunan’s provincial leadership. This new leadership, while mindful of
Beijing’s mandate, also sought to address local concerns, enlist local help, and
persuade skeptical audiences. In Governor Chen Baozhen’s August 4, 1896
proclamation he wrote:
Moreover, the line in Hunan will pass over only Imperial highways and
courier routes, the care of which will be deputed to the chief representatives
of the gentry of each district and hence will interfere in no way with the
fields, ancestral graves, and houses of the common people, nor will it harm
them in any way. Furthermore, the poles, material, and labour are to be
supplied by the natives of each district through the agency of each chief
representative of the gentry of the said districts, and lastly, after the work is
done the care of the line will still be in the hands of the gentry and local
watchmen engaged on the spot. As it will not be productive of harm to the
people, but on the contrary benefit them, the advantage of the line will be
greater to Hunan than it has been to other provinces. It will be of great use to
government business and will benefit businessmen in their pursuit after gain.19
Apart from Hunan, most problems appear to have arisen in the 1890s in areas
15
16
17
18
19

NCDN, August 5, 1891, 124.
Ibid., 159.
Ibid., August 19, 1891, 171, citing Hubao.
See YWYD, vol. 6, 422–27.
North China Herald, “Telegraph Construction in Hunan,” September 4, 1896, 407–8.
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near the lines southwest of Beijing in Shanxi, Shaanxi, Henan, and Gansu
provinces.20 As lines reached into the hinterland along strategic routes, some of
which were built, financed, and maintained by provincial authorities, local
resistance, if manifested, was defeated and the lines kept open.21 In 1892, two
years after ITA’s Baoding-Xi’an line through Shanxi 22 was completed, and
proclamations had been issued to local jurisdictions (xiang) to protect these lines,
elite-led destruction destroyed lines in several central Shanxi counties. Provincial
troops restored order and the Shanxi line reopened a few months later.23
Nevertheless, especially in troubled North China, Li Hongzhang had
recognized the need for line protection. He used money from his provincial
treasury to fund military protection of new lines in the 1880s; he later attempted
to transfer this responsibility to county-level militias whenever possible. Military
protection of landlines remained a budget item in North China to the end of the
nineteenth century.24
The construction of this telegraph network was a tangible symbol of enhanced
Qing state visibility at the local level. From the proclamations posted by county
officials to announce construction, to the local responsibilities for security, the
local and the metropolitan were now, literally, connected by 22,000 miles of
wires in 1900. More than half of these lines, especially in strategically important
but less populated areas like Xinjiang, Gansu, and Heilongjiang, were
constructed, operated, and maintained by provincial authorities; the remaining
lines, which have received most of the scholarly attention to this topic, were
owned and operated by the privately-held Imperial Telegraph Administration
headed by Li Hongzhang’s protégé Sheng Xuanhuai. From Shanghai, ITA lines
reached north, south, and west to China’s provinces along the coast and up the
Yangzi River. Another important ITA line ran from Baoding in Zhili province to
Xi’an in Shaanxi. But as the line continued west into Gansu it was taken over by
20
See YWYD, vol. 6, 325–460, for a collection of edicts and memorials concerning telegraphy
drawn from the Qing-dynasty archives in Beijing for the period February 1875–February
1894 (GX1/1–GX19/12). This selection of edicts and memorials covers the period in which
most of the network was constructed (1879–93). Oppositional episodes are documented in
Yangwu yundong for Henan, Shaanxi, and Gansu, as well as the Hunan and Shanxi cases
discussed in the text.
21
Wang Ermin has surveyed the published Zongli Yamen archive Haifang dang, which
includes extensive documentation of telegraphy in China, for documents related to these
strategic routes in the hinterland. See Wang Ermin, “Sheng Xuanhuai yu Zhongguo dianbao
shiye de jingying,” 764–65.
22
Ibid., 787.
23
YWYD, vol. 6, 447–50; Wang, “Sheng Xuanhuai yu Zhongguo dianbao shiye de jingying,”
781.
24
Yoon, “The Grand Council and the Communication Systems in the Late Qing,” 191. See
also Haifang dang, IV/1/111-123 (Table of Contents) for a listing of line-protection
communications from 1884 to 1902.
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the government-run telegraph bureau in Lanzhou. Provincial authorities could
also manage provincial networks that connected to the ITA network. Among the
provinces operating such networks were Yunnan, Guangdong, and Jiangsu.25 In
1908 lines operated by provincial governments (difang guan ban) were 49,480
huali (about 16,493 miles) in length; commercial lines (shang ban) were 41,417
huali (about 13,806 miles) in length. As we have seen, some of these commercial
lines—the Tianjin-Shanghai line is a good example—were constructed by the
Qing government and then quickly turned over to Sheng Xuanhuai’s ITA. By
1908 there were 155 government-run telegraph stations and 239
commercially-operated telegraph stations.26 Most of these lines and stations had
been constructed by 1900 (by 1895 the ITA part of the network had almost 200
stations).27
Whether lines and stations were operated by provincial governments or the
ITA, by 1897 all provincial officials could now submit telegraphic memorials and
receive telegraphic imperial instructions. As the network was under construction
new communications protocols were developed in Beijing. The Grand Council
had taken over the responsibility from the Zongli Yamen for archiving telegrams
in 1884, the year telegraph wires reached almost to the Forbidden City and
Beijing gained direct telegraphic communications with six provincial capitals.
This government telegraph station connected to the domestic network at the ITA
25

Chiba, Kindai kōtsū taikei to Shin Teikoku no henbō, Provincial Tables, Table 2.1,
70–80.
26
See Zhongguo jindai youdian shi, 65. A statistical series issues by the Ministry of Posts and
Communications (Youchuan bu) for 1907 lists ten provincial telegraph bureaus (the three
provinces in Manchuria were under one bureau). See Youchuan bu diyici dianzheng tongjibiao
(GX33), 30. The most extensive provincial networks were in Yunnan (ibid., 207–8) and
Guangdong (ibid., 139–40). Provinces with great distances to string with lines include
Xinjiang (ibid., 237–38) and Gansu (ibid., 185–86). One of the best accounts of the building of
the global telegraph network in East Asia mistakenly characterizes Sheng Xuanhuai’s ITA as a
monopoly and says official lines were “outside the network.” See Ahvenainen, The Far
Eastern Telegraphs, 62. Ahvenainen’s ITA-centric view of China’s telegraph network is a
result, in part, of the nature of his sources: Western-language diplomatic, regulatory, and
commercial archives. While limited, it is important to emphasize that these sources, especially
those of the Bureau of the International Telegraph Union headquartered in Berne, Switzerland,
help us see China’s domestic telegraph network in a global context. For example, the
French-language publication Notification issued from Berne informed the world in 1887 that
China’s ITA had 76 stations, a number that grew to almost 200 by 1895. See Ahvenainen, The
Far Eastern Telegraphs, 64. But it is only by consulting Chinese-language archives and
documentary compilations (Haifang dang; Yangwu yundong) that one can glimpse the crucial
government-run lines of China’s strategic telegraphic network. For secondary works drawing
on this Chinese material see Wang, “Sheng Xuanhuai yu Zhongguo dianbao shiye de
jingying,” Zhongguo jindai youdian shi; Baark, Lightning Wires; Yoon, “The Grand Council
and the Communication Systems in the Late Qing.”
27
Ahvenainen, The Far Eastern Telegraphs, 64.
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office outside the imperial precincts. ITA, via Shanghai, connected China to the
world.28
At first, the modernization of China’s strategic communications network was
adapted to the Qing-era palace-memorial system. This system, while based in
part on Ming-dynasty precedents, had evolved in the early-eighteenth century
with the ad hoc group of high Qing officials who managed the most sensitive of
the strategic communications between the emperor and his military commanders
in Inner Asia. Over time the Grand Council (Junjichu) of advisors and
communications managers became quite important and influential. With a paper
trail and a set of archives outside the purview of the six central government
ministries, and answerable only to the emperor, the Grand Council’s influence
and importance was formidable. A palace memorial was a confidential
communication between the emperor and his highest officials. It was, in fact, to
be written by the official himself. The emperor wrote his comments and replies
in vermillion ink on the document and returned it to the provincial official who,
once he had noted the emperor’s will, sent the document back to Beijing for
archiving.29
This was the most secure and secret communication channel. Court letters,
with imperial instructions, were prepared by the Grand Council on behalf of the
emperor. These important documents were semi-secret, since Grand Council
ministers were privy to both the discussions and the emperor’s instructions,
which could take the form, for example, of edicts. Those palace memorials
forwarded for discussion to the Six Ministries and other metropolitan offices
were semi-open in their ostensible classification. Finally, unclassified documents
were sent to the Grand Secretariat for public distribution. These documents could
be sent over from the Grand Council or other metropolitan offices in Beijing.30
Those unclassified documents released for open distribution were posted on
the “boards” by the Grand Secretariat and were available for inspection by other
officials, especially those responsible for selecting documents of interest to
particular provincial audiences. By the mid-nineteenth century this official
function had been partially superseded by private companies that paid scribes for
28

Chiba, Kindai kō tsū taikei to Shin Teikoku no henbō , 84–85; Yoon, “The Grand
Council and the Communication Systems in the Late Qing,” 184–85.
29
Beatrice S. Bartlett, Monarchs and Ministers: The Grand Council in Mid-Ch’ing China,
1723–1820; J. K. Fairbank and S. Y. Teng, “Of the Types and Uses of Ch’ing Documents,”
24–34.
30
For this classification typology, see Silas H. L. Wu, Communication and Imperial Control
in China: Evolution of the Palace Memorial System, 1693–1735, 104–5. Publicly-issued
imperial instructions (mingfa shengyu) were released by the Grand Secretariat. See ibid., 102.
For a working definition of “court letter” (tingji) see Fairbank and Teng, “Types and Uses,”
66–67.
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the information posted on the “boards.” These private publishing houses
(baofang) produced what was known to Westerners as the Peking Gazette. While
the materials printed in the various Peking Gazettes were official government
documents, the selection, publication, and distribution were unofficial and
private.31 Moreover, most of the material released to the public was concerned
with routine matters of government business. Sensitive, confidential documents
were kept within the Forbidden City; the most sensitive and secret by the
emperor himself; the more sensitive and semi-secret in the files of the Grand
Council.
The notion of information infrastructure can be applied to this traditional
palace-memorial system of imperial communications. It too had an important
material aspect that had a pragmatic effect on both its practitioners and, we can
hypothesize, those aware of its operation. Unlike the modern anonymity and
invisibility of telegraphy’s pulses of energy through wires, court letters and
memorials, traditionally, were carried by mounted express couriers along
established communication lines. In a sense, the message was embodied. For
bystanders throughout China, one need not know the contents of the reports to
recognize that important information was being couriered to or from Beijing; the
penal code, too, brought attention to the network, criminalizing actions that
might impede these information flows. In the Forbidden City meticulous and
detailed regulations insured the tracking, storage, and retrieval of these highly
classified documents.32
How, in China, did telegraphy affect these familiar conventions, practices, and
relationships? Were there unintended consequences as China sought to secure its
borders and communicate quickly with its diplomatic representatives abroad with
timely electronic communications? Infrastructure is neither value-neutral nor
inert; communications infrastructure is about relationships and when
infrastructures change relationships change. Could these two information
infrastructures, one indigenous and one Western in origin, be integrated
effectively? Moreover, what happens when a familiar information infrastructure
is compromised and neither the medium nor the message is available?
Telegraphic court letters were dispatched and telegraphic memorials were
31

K. C. Liu and Hao Yanping (Hao Yen-p’ing), in an article with a late-Qing focus,
characterize the “so-called ‘Peking Gazette’ [as] an unofficial reprinting of notes and
documents issued at court.” See Barbara Mittler, A Newspaper for China?: Power, Identity,
and Change in Shanghai’s News Media, 1872–1912, 175n9. The commercialization of its
publication had begun by the mid-nineteenth century. See ibid., 181n38. For Barbara Mittler’s
masterful overview of the complicated publishing history of this gazette see ibid., 177–87.
32
See Ying-wan Cheng, Postal Communication in China and Its Modernization, 1860–1896,
10–26. For a discussion on telegraph-line security and punishments see Yoon, “The Grand
Council and the Communication Systems in the Late Qing,” 191–92.
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received, but the new technology did present challenges for the Qing government.
At first an effort was made to keep practices and processes familiar. The Zongli
Yamen, established in 1861 to facilitate communications between China and
Western countries, which was the government bureau that had successfully
lobbied the throne to allow telegraph wire into Beijing in 1884,33 was given the
responsibility of decoding, transcribing, formatting, and forwarding telegraphic
memorials to the Grand Council for final processing for presentation to the
emperor. Likewise, when highly classified and urgent imperial instructions
needed to be telegraphed to provincial officials, the Grand Council forwarded
these to the Zongli Yamen for encoding and telegraphic transmission. The Zongli
Yamen, then, was central to the transmission of government telegraphic
communications until the end of the nineteenth century.34
We should pause at this point and consider the materiality of these two means
of communication: the express courier system and the telegraphic network. The
traditional court letter was drafted, copied, and sealed in the Grand Council and
dispatched to the provinces by express couriers whose progress was duly noted in
post-station logbooks. The semi-secret court letter, which could include an
imperial edict, was opened only by the recipient, a recipient who could document
the process of transmission and assess the markers of authenticity—the paper, the
calligraphy, the formatting, the seals—of the document itself that, he knew,
originated from deep within the Forbidden City.
The provenance of a telegraphic court letter, by contrast, was different,
significantly different. First, the message was taken out of the Forbidden City
and delivered to the Zongli Yamen. There the Chinese characters had to be
located in a book that equated each character to a unique four-digit number. The
Zongli Yamen then sent out the telegram, which had to be received and
re-transmitted in telegraph offices across China. Finally reaching the offices of
the recipient, the stream of four-digit groups of numbers received by the last
telegrapher had to be converted back into Chinese characters. Many steps; many
hands. And the original document, dematerialized in Beijing and transmitted by
numeric Morse code to its recipient, might never be seen by the recipient. The
hallmarks of the traditional court-letter system were speed and secrecy.
Telegraphy certainly enhanced speed, but it opened for the first time the
possibility of garbled transmissions, and communications security became much
33
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34
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harder for the Grand Council to maintain as its court letters became telegrams at
the Zongli Yamen, where the telegrams were prepared for transmission to the
provinces.
Unlike the Grand Council, whose office was located near the emperor within
the Forbidden City, the Zongli Yamen was located just outside its eastern wall.
Foreign diplomats, who had craved access to imperial authority since at least the
first Opium War35 were still being buffered by Qing officials. Even in the midst
of international crises diplomats only saw, on a face-to-face basis, members of
the Zongli Yamen. These men could be, however, very important and influential
metropolitan officials. Moreover, members of both the Grand Council and the
Zongli Yamen served concurrently in other metropolitan offices, and in some
cases one official was both a member of the Grand Council and the Zongli
Yamen. Coordination within the Qing government, then, was a function of both
organization and personnel. In the age of telegraphy, in a manner similar to the
model of telegraphic memorials from provincial officials, the Zongli Yamen was
responsible for relaying diplomatic messages to the emperor via the Grand
Council. But provincial officials, unlike foreign diplomats, could also
communicate directly with the emperor via the Grand Council (bypassing the
Zongli Yamen) by writing a palace memorial and entrusting its delivery to the
express-courier system operated by the Ministry of War.
Beginning in 1884, then, the strategic communications of the Qing dynasty
depended on both a new telegraphic network and the familiar express-courier
system. Foreign diplomats relied on telegraphy, the international postal system,
and personal couriers. As the Boxer Uprising of 1900 would make clear, the
resilience and reliability of the hybrid strategic communications network of the
Qing dynasty was superior to the suddenly vulnerable Western-style telegraph
network that depended on lines owned and operated by China. In different ways
these familiar and new infrastructures became visible in the crisis and collapse of
1900.

Paradox
Paradoxically, the networking of the Qing state through telegraphy, made
possible in part by positive provincial responses to new mandates from Beijing, a
networking that made Qing defense of borders and integration of provinces more
effective, also created a new opportunity for lateral communications (and the

35
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implicit threat of factionalism) among officials from different provinces.36
By the late-Qing period provincial officials and elites kept abreast of Beijing
news and policies via numerous gazettes published privately, mostly for specific
provincial audiences. As we have seen, these gazettes (Jingbao; Tangbao; Dibao)
usually referred to by Westerners as the Peking Gazette, were based, in part, on
official documents released by the Grand Secretariat on the authority of the
Grand Council. This was also a venue for news about routine government
business; it was not intended, for the most part, for the sensitive or confidential
information characteristic of the palace-memorial system. The gazettes reached
provincial capitals, where they were reproduced for the target audience.37 This
was one of the few means by which provincial officials could glimpse what was
happening in Beijing and elsewhere in the empire. (Also, they were seen by
Westerners on the south China coast as early as the mid-nineteenth century,
offering a rare way to discern what was happening in far-off Beijing. This
curiosity notwithstanding, in 1842 at least some provincial officials thought it
treasonous to show gazettes to foreigners.)38 The Beijing-centric information
flow was echoed by new telegraphic protocols.
Beginning in August 1898 unclassified edicts authorized by the Grand Council
to be openly distributed were required to be transmitted by the Imperial
Telegraph Administration. It is worth noting that this particular imperial use of
telegraphy for communicating with provincial officials began in the waning days
of the Hundred Days’ Reforms. The Guangxu emperor wrote in an edict of
August 27 (GX24/7/11):
Owing to the pretexts our Viceroys and Governors have recently made to
excuse the delay they have been guilty of in obeying our commands to begin
reform works in their various provinces, we hereby command that in future
all our edicts will be sent by telegraph and that the said Viceroys and
Governors are to obey our decrees immediately [when] they receive such
36
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telegrams, without waiting as heretofore for the arrival of said edicts, written
out in full, by overland courier through the Board of War.39
The emperor, frustrated by what he took to be the delaying tactics of his
provincial governors, granted to these telegraphed edicts an authority that turned
the full hardcopy version of the edict coming from Beijing into a confirming
message. Act, he demanded, on the basis of the telegraphic edict.
This had the potential for increasing Beijing’s control of the provinces,
perhaps one of the reasons this innovation appears to have been unaffected by the
ending of the Hundred Days’ Reforms in September 1898. But it could have
unintended consequences. Once edicts could be transmitted by telegraph the
security of the system was lessened. Forging a hardcopy imperial edict was much
harder to do than a telegraphic edict, which came across the wire in four-digit
groups of numbers like any other message, public or private, important or
unimportant. Nevertheless, no longer would there be a long wait for a private
gazette, whose contents were selected for publication by non-officials for specific
audiences, for details about an open edict. Moreover, unlike the privately selected
and published documents in gazettes, the open edicts were telegraphed by the
authority of the central government to provincial governments. In essence, these
telegraphic edicts constituted a government-issued electronic Peking Gazette of
edicts that, for the first time, was truly timely, official, and singular.
Telegraphy had also affected the provinces’ ties to Beijing. Since 1884
provincial officials had been telegraphing urgent memorials to the Zongli Yamen
for submission to the court (daizou), even if they continued using either the
routine or express courier systems for most Beijing-bound correspondence.40
The new technology also made it possible for convenient and timely lateral
communications between provinces. While such province-to-province
communications had always been facilitated under the jurisdiction of a
governor-general, lateral communications among governors in a particular set of
provinces now became much easier. Thus, telegraphy—a new communications
infrastructure—had the potential to both unify and fracture China in familiar and
unfamiliar ways. This observation applies as well to society. New print media
39
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such as Shanghai’s Shenbao introduced the Chinese public to Western-style
journalism in the late-nineteenth century. These media, like their counterparts in
the West, depended on telegraphy for content and this content could ignite
telegraphic firestorms. One of the earliest and most famous of these occurred in
early 1900, a few years after the telegraph network reached the last of China’s
provincial capitals (1897), and concerned the Empress Dowager’s plans for
succession after the reign of the Guangxu emperor. Telegraphic protests,
including telegrams from Chinese overseas, document an aspect of “Chinese
public opinion” on the eve of the Boxer Uprising.41
Shenbao is also part of this story because of its own use of imperial documents.
One could argue that the Guangxu emperor’s August 1898 decision to send open
edicts by telegraph constituted the Qing government’s first effort to use this new
technology to reach, through provincial yamens, the people. Shenbao, which was
known for its own version of a Peking Gazette similar in content and style to
other Peking Gazettes, had a special correspondent in Beijing. On January 16,
1882, soon after the Tianjin-Shanghai line was complete, Shenbao published the
first edict its correspondent had telegraphed from the north. 42 By 1884 its
correspondent could transmit documents to Shanghai directly from Beijing. With
this telegraphed information in hand, Shenbao’s editors could prepare what was
essentially their own telegraphic Peking Gazette.
The Guangxu emperor’s 1898 instructions can also be seen as part of this
opening-up process. Open edicts that special correspondents in Beijing were
already telegraphing to newspapers like Shenbao would now be transmitted on
the specific authority of the central government itself to provincial officials. At
the very least this would address the awkward situation of the periodical press
publicizing an imperial edict days, if not weeks, ahead of a provincial
government’s announcement of the same imperial decision. The Qing state was
now speaking in its own voice, no longer depending entirely on private
publishers to select and communicate its most important messages.
By the end of 1898 all provincial governments could now receive open
telegraphic edicts from Beijing at about the same time. The mediation of time
and distance was collapsed, a mediation that had previously allowed more
autonomy to provincial officials, and protected the central government in Beijing
from being implicated as an accessory to foreign hectoring. But now diplomats
could demand that the government authorize timely distribution of open edicts
throughout China over its telegraph network. No longer would envoys need to
rely on the private publishers of the Peking Gazette. This combination of 1)
changing center-periphery relationships, 2) a new communications technology,
41
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and 3) a foreign community insisting that China speak with one voice in accord
with treaty rights and foreign demands was extraordinarily volatile.

Disaster
One of the key properties of infrastructure, according to Susan Star, is its
becoming “visible upon breakdown.” She also argues that infrastructure is not
infrastructure until its material reality is connected to organized practices. If this
is true, then the breakdown of the material implies a relational collapse as well.43
But what does it mean for an infrastructure to become visible upon breakdown?
As we have seen, there was an extensive telegraphic infrastructure at risk in 1900.
Crucial sections literally broke down, or were destroyed, during the Boxer
Uprising. At multiple points along the lines leading to Beijing from Mongolia,
Manchuria, and the two routes from the south, the lines were cut. The destruction
of lines along the Grand Canal extended almost to the border with Jiangsu. The
lines bisecting Shanxi were cut at numerous points, and the section between
Kaifeng (Henan) and the Shandong border were cut as well. Finally, a lateral line
between the Zhili capital at Baoding, and Tianjin to the east, was also cut in
numerous locations.44
Qing officials had seen this coming in the spring of 1900. As a rural
insurgency spread in North China, government officials quickly began to focus
attention on vulnerable communications lines. The budget crisis, precipitated in
part by the indemnity levied by Japan after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95,
had prompted demobilization of regular soldiers and increased reliance for local
security on militias.45 Fewer soldiers were responsible for line security in North
China, and neither soldiers nor militia proved capable of defending the network.
Many sources, including the Grand Council archive of telegraphic traffic,
document its collapse. The Zongli Yamen noted the May 27, 1900 (GX26/4/29)
cutting of the Beijing-Baoding line.46 The next day, May 28, Sheng Xuanhuai
telegraphed Zhili governor Yulu that he must protect the lines. Liu Kunyi also
raised an alarm.47 Two days later the court itself called on provincial officials to
43
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use soldiers to protect the Tianjin-Shanghai and Baoding-Shanghai lines. Zhang
Zhidong telegraphed the contents of this edict to Sheng Xuanhuai on June 4,
1900 (GX26/5/8).48 But the news from North China only worsened. Yulu’s
Tianjin register of telegraphic traffic for 10–15 June lists thirty-five outgoing
telegrams. On June 11 he telegraphed Sheng Xuanhuai in Jiangsu about the
interruption of the telegraphic connection to Beijing.49 Another key record of
provincial and extra-provincial telegraphic traffic, which recorded an average of
twenty telegrams a day in early June 1900 routed through Tianjin, falls silent on
June 13, 1900 (GX 26/5/17),50 the day the Beijing-Tianjin line, which split at
Tianjin into a northern line to Manchuria and a southern line to Shanghai, was
cut. 51 The line to Russia went dead the same day, June 14, 52 that the
Tianjin-Ji’nan line was cut. Yuan Shikai, who would play a crucial role during
the crisis, telegraphed this news from Shandong to Zhang Zhidong on June 15.53
Zhang Zhidong, who served as a kind of clearing house for information and tried
to keep key officials informed, appeared to think early in the crisis that
communications could be quickly restored as long as provincial and local
officials fulfilled their responsibilities.54
Ironically, Westerners, who would insist throughout this crisis on unimpeded
access to “lines of communications,” contributed to the communications chaos
by their own actions on June 15. Naval commanders in the Gulf of Zhili, on their
own authority, directed Japanese, Russian, and French forces to seize control of
three key rail stations between Tianjin and the Dagu Forts. Three hundred
Japanese took control of the Tanggu Rail Station just west of the forts; a Russian
and French force occupied the Tianjin station near the governor-general’s yamen;
and a Russian force occupied a station between these two points.55 In a repeat of
48

Zhang, Zhang Zhidong quanji , vol. 10, 7964.
British Parliamentary Papers, China No. 1 (1901): 159 (Outgoing telegram #306, June 11).
50
Zhidong jiaofei diancun.
51
June 13, 1900 (GX26/5/17) is the date of first “transfer telegram” (zhuandian) listed in the
Grand Council’s documentary register Suishou dengji. (See 28–29 for explanations of this term
and source.) The published archive of the Grand Council’s outgoing telegraphic traffic ends on
June 8, 1900 (GX26/5/12); outgoing traffic in the record book does not resume until February
9, 1902 (GX28/1/2); incoming traffic in the telegraphic archive record book ends on June 16,
1900 (GX26/5/20) and except for a brief two-week period in July does not resume until
January 7, 1901 (GX27/11/28). I have seen no evidence that suggests that Beijing’s telegraphic
connection had been restored in mid-July; Suishou dengji continues to note various transfer
telegrams for this period.
52
British Minister Claude MacDonald’s last June telegram (his 110th in June) to Lord
Salisbury went via the Kiachta line on June 14. See Leonard Kenneth Young, British Policy in
China, 1895–1902, 119n2.
53
Zhang, Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 10, 7978.
54
Ibid., 7985.
55
Li Dezheng, Su Weizhi, and Liu Tianlu, Baguo lianjun qin Hua shi, 102, 444. See also
maps at 103 and 127.
49

412

Roger R. Thompson

actions taken by the Japanese in 1894–95,56 and by the Germans at Qingdao in
1897,57 telegraph lines were cut and the ability of the court to monitor Allied
naval movements in real time was further compromised.
These were not ad hoc actions by Japan, Russia, and Germany; whether
intended or not, these were acts of war. In the nineteenth century, submarine
cables and landlines had become objects of international attention and concern,
especially in military and strategic-planning circles. In 1875 the International
Telegraph Convention of St. Petersburg decided that states controlled their
networks: they were not required to send another country’s message, as long as
notification was given. Even notification could be dispensed with if it
represented a threat to state security.58 The International Telegraph Convention
of 1884 recognized that its peacetime rules did not apply in times of war.59
China had followed international precedents in its instructions in 1898 to
telegraph offices to reject any foreign coded telegrams during national crises.60
In a British report of October 22, 1898 strategic planners (Colonial Defence
Committee) meeting behind closed doors had advised the government that “we
ought to cut an enemy’s cables wherever necessary for strategic purposes.”61 In
practice the state that controlled the wires and cables controlled the message,62 a
new reality Britain addressed with its “all-red” telegraph network. At this point
Britain had almost completed its “all-red” network of imperial communications,
so named because both landlines and the landings of submarine cables never left
British territory, then represented on British maps in red. (This network was
completed in 1902.)63
The Allied cutting of the telegraph line at the Tanggu Rail Station, the line Li
56
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Hongzhang had built in 1879 to connect his Tianjin office with the Dagu Forts,
meant that officials at the Tianjin end of the Beijing-Tianjin axis, already cut off
from Beijing, were now cut off from telegraphic contact with authorities in
Manchuria. 64 This also meant, however, that Western military forces now
surrounding the Dagu Forts could not communicate by telegraph with their
compatriots in Tianjin.
For Westerners in North China in mid-1900 it was impossible to send or
receive telegrams. The West had come to rely on timely communications
between capitals and distant military and diplomatic personnel. 65 The
communications blackout in 1900 was hardly anticipated by Western
governments. Their responses varied, with some countries like Great Britain
relinquishing control to China Station naval commanders, while leaders in
Washington D.C. tried to exercise as much control as possible on a day-to-day
basis. 66 China’s hybrid communications structure, however, proved to be
adaptable, flexible, and resilient during the crisis. The express-courier system
managed by the Ministry of War continued to function and proved to be
instrumental in a critical adaptation during the crisis: the use of the “transfer
memorial” and the “transfer edict” for especially important telegraphic
communications. The first edict sent by transfer telegrams (zhuandian) left for
Tianjin on June 13, 1900 (GX26/5/17), the day the Beijing-Tianjin line was cut.67
How did the “transfer network” operate? For outgoing telegrams from Beijing,
express couriers headed for the first functioning telegraph station with a link to
the network; incoming telegrams were sent to the same stations for transfer to
Beijing via express couriers: two stations in Zhili (Baoding and Shanhaiguan)
64
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and one in Shandong (Ji’nan) were the three stations in this ad hoc and
extraordinary infrastructural adaptation. Zhang Zhidong, who seems to have
thought in mid-June that telegraphic communications with Beijing could be
restored, informed fellow officials on July 15 how the network operated. He
telegraphed his colleagues in Sichuan, Shaanxi, Fujian, Guangdong, and Henan
about transit times for transfer memorials from Xi’an, Kaifeng, and Ji’nan.
Zhang said a telegraphic memorial received by Yuan Shikai in Shandong could
be transferred to Beijing in 5–6 days.68 Most transfer telegrams were routed
through Baoding and Ji’nan, in part because the Shanhaiguan transfers were less
secure. (Before reaching or leaving Shanghai these transfers were routed through
the Great Northern submarine cable from Vladivostok.) Unlike the foreigners
trapped in Beijing, by this means the Qing court was able to use telegraphy
during the Boxer Uprising. This use, however, was restricted to only the most
important messages: those going to Chinese ministers abroad and foreign heads
of state, and periodically to major provincial officials such as Li Hongzhang,
Zhang Zhidong, Liu Kunyi, and a handful of others. In these exceptional cases,
less than ten percent of all edicts in the first two weeks of the crisis, the court
would send outgoing telegrams by express courier to Baoding, Ji’nan, or
Shanhaiguan. Incoming telegrams could follow the same routes, conveyed by
express courier for the final leg to Beijing. We can track these information flows
in an important archival resource: Suishou dengji (Records of [documents] at
hand). This Grand Council register of imperial communications recorded,
sometimes on an hourly basis, incoming and outgoing messages between the
imperial court and its highest officials.69
For the period June 13, 1900–June 30, 1900 (GX 26/5/17 to GX26/6/4) the
following transfer telegraphic edicts are entered in Suishou dengji: for Tianjin
June 13 (GX26/5/17) (to Shanghai: telegraph lines cut; Sheng Xuanhuai to
repair), June 17 (GX26/5/21) (to Yuan Shikai; come to Beijing), June 25
(GX26/5/29) (to Yuan Shikai); for Baoding June 24 (GX26/5/28) (to Yuxian),
June 25 (GX26/5/29) (to Li Hongzhang, Li Bingheng, and others), June 26
(GX26/5/30) (to Yangzi governors), June 29 (GX26/6/3) (Chinese ministers
abroad). This practice would continue.70
68
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We can also use Suishou dengji to track the transfer telegraphic memorials
arriving in Beijing throughout the crisis. For example, Liu Kunyi and Zhang
Zhidong submitted a telegraphic memorial, routed via Yuan Shikai, that was
received in Ji’nan on June 27 (GX26/6/1) and transferred to Beijing and noted in
Suishou dengji on June 29 (GX26/6/3). We also know that Liu and Zhang had
telegraphed a memorial to Ji’nan based on information in a collection of Yuan
Shikai’s memorials. 71 Another important Ji’nan transfer is noted in Suishou
dengji entries for July 24 (GX26/6/28). The first item is a memorial concerning
the situation in Beijing from Liu Kunyi, Zhang Zhidong, and four other
provincial officials that was sent by express courier from Ji’nan on July 21
(GX26/6/25).72 A court letter in response describes the condition and treatment
of the ministers in Beijing, information that addressed the widely-circulated, but
totally unfounded, rumor of a “Peking Massacre.” Appended to this entry are
instructions to send the court letter to Yuan Shikai via express courier.73 These
are two important correlations between Suishou dengji and Yuan Shikai’s
collection of memorials. The two memorials and others demonstrate the
continuing use of the transfer network throughout the crisis. For the period
June 27–August 1 (GX26/6/1–GX26/7/7) there are seven transfer telegraphic
memorials in Yuan’s collection: three from groups of provincial officials signing
off on telegrams submitted by Liu Kunyi or Li Hongzhang; three transfer
telegrams came from Chinese ministers abroad (Washington, D.C. and Berlin);
and one from a provincial official.74
In the Boxer Uprising of 1900 the modern but vulnerable information
infrastructure connecting Beijing to the world broke down and was made
transparent. Paradoxically, the Qing’s own information infrastructure, which had
integrated telegraphy into its organized practices, did not break down and hence
was less visible. Suishou dengji, which, as we have seen, documented specific
edicts and memorials, also allows us to explore the Qing information
infrastructure from a second vantage point: “as a trace or record of activities.” As
71
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Susan Star points out: “[T]he infrastructure itself becomes an informationcollecting device.”75 As an imperial record book, Suishou dengji documents a
functioning information infrastructure, which, because of its functionality,
remained largely invisible. Few if any Westerners, worried about the breakdown
of their own information infrastructure, could have been aware of these recorded
traces of action that linked village China to the metropolitan center of power in
time-honored ways.
As we have seen, the Qing government, which had come to depend on its
telegraphic connection with the empire, continued to use traditional
communications without disruption. Edicts left Beijing; an average number of
memorials were duly received, recorded, and acted upon. The nerve center of the
empire was the Grand Council, which recorded all incoming and outgoing
communications (mostly provincial memorials and imperial edicts) in Suishou
dengji. In the three-month period that included the Siege of the Legations, the
Grand Council’s record book ran to 435 pages; the previous quarter’s total was
370 pages; for the subsequent four months the page count is 569. The court was
in touch with all parts of the empire. In the first six weeks of the crisis five
governors-general submitted 86 separate documents for June 13–July 16
(GX26/5/5 to GX26/6/20). Almost half of these were dispatched by Liu Kunyi
from Nanjing.
Outside of North China, there is neither evidence of any communications crisis
nor broader infrastructural breakdown. The court and its provincial
officials—Zhang Zhidong is a good example—were frustrated by the delays
caused by the North China communications crisis. Zhang, like others, had called
attention to the problem from the beginning. On June 16, Zhang followed up a
telegraphic memorial to the court with a direct communication to Ronglu, an
important Beijing official, sent via three different cities (Shanghai, Tianjin, and
Baoding) about the importance of restoring communications with Beijing.76
Zhang, even as he used the transfer system, continued to press for a restoration of
north-south lines of communication. In late July Zhang, along with Yuan Shikai
and Liu Kunyi, memorialized their urgent request for network repairs. The court
agreed, sending a court letter to all provinces that left Beijing on August 3
(GX26/7/9). It directed provincial officials to repair and protect telegraph lines,
especially the Baoding-Taiyuan-Xi’an line. 77 Moreover, the adaptability and
75
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flexibility of this time-honored system can be glimpsed in the pages of Suishou
dengji. The crisis of the court’s final days in Beijing in mid-August is reflected in
the hurried calligraphy and rough formatting of individual entries. But within
days of the court’s departure documentary normalcy returned, and the court’s
continuing connection to the rest of China through its express couriers can be
documented in the smaller travelling version of the Grand Council’s record
book.78
The vulnerability of telegraph lines, which both strengthen the state and make
it more responsive, can also force it to commit military resources for line
protection. This has little parallel with express couriers. Nevertheless, for a
central government that had been telegraphically connected since 1884, this
reversion to a reliance on only one system for the first and last legs of outgoing
and incoming communications was but a temporary expedient. This ended when
the court reached Xi’an (Shaanxi) in October 1900 and re-connected with the
telegraph network. Once in Xi’an the small travelling Zongli Yamen resumed its
role of conveying imperial messages to the empire, setting up its telegraph office
in Xi’an’s provincial examination hall.79 A day before the court’s arrival on
October 26, 1900 (GX26/9/4), it had sent a transfer telegram to Yikuang, Li
Hongzhang, and others asking for advice. On October 28, 1900 (GX26/9/6), a
day after the court’s arrival, it received its first direct telegraphic memorial since
the lines to Beijing were cut in June, submitted by numerous officials, including
Yikuang (Beijing), Li Hongzhang (Beijing), Xiliang (Shanxi), Sheng Xuanhuai
(Shanghai), and Sichuan Governor-general Kuijun.80 This group telegram from
some of the most powerful and influential of its officials marked the
reconsolidation of the imperial center at Xi’an and the restoration of the crucial
connection, lost since mid-June when the last two of the three lines to Beijing
were cut, to its strategically important telegraph network. This exchange between
the court and its highest officials should be placed in a broader context, one made
visible because of the partial breakdown of the telegraphic infrastructure in North
China.
Although we have seen how Beijing was able to keep its strategic
communications system functioning, we know that the West was facing not only
an infrastructural breakdown, but also an “information panic” that was a result of
both a news blackout and a projection on China of long-standing mistrust and
fears.81 Because of the international crisis, powerful provincial governors like Li
78
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Hongzhang, Zhang Zhidong, Liu Kunyi, and Yuan Shikai, all of whom were
qualified to be members of the Grand Council or the Zongli Yamen, were forced
to play a metropolitan role in their dealings with Westerners in other parts of
China. While, as we have seen, they had kept in contact with Beijing through
familiar and extraordinary measures alike, there was not enough time to await
replies and instructions, and these governors, referred to as the “Southern
Governors,” played an ad hoc role as a de facto Zongli Yamen, which, as we
have seen, was the Beijing office that communicated telegraphically with the rest
of China and had mediated between the West and the court. But, with the cutting
off of Beijing and the Siege of the Legations, there was little for the Zongli
Yamen to do in Beijing. (In this context Shanghai, which was the central hub of
China’s commercial and government telegraph networks, had emerged as the
communications node for both domestic and international governmental and
diplomatic traffic during the crisis.)
In the moment of crisis we also see evidence that provincial governors had
become accustomed to using telegraphy to communicate laterally—
province-to-province—on matters of regional importance. This communications
infrastructure became visible during the partial breakdown of 1900; while the
court continued to communicate by familiar means, most of China’s telegraph
network outside North China was still operational. The lateral communication
between provincial capitals continued. For the six-week period June 13,
1900–July 25, 1900 (GX26/5/17-GX26/6/29), Li Hongzhang’s collected works
include about 400 incoming and outgoing telegrams in the draft telegram section.
Most of these are lateral communications with other provincial officials. Li also
mentions or forwards for memorializing incoming telegrams from Chinese
ministers in Great Britain, France, Germany, the United States, Japan, and Korea.
Li also received transfer telegrams from Baoding, some of which were routed
through Shanghai and presumably went to other provincial officials as well. In a
few cases Li tried to communicate directly to the Grand Council and Zongli
Yamen with Baoding transfer telegrams, a few of which he asked Baoding to
memorialize.82
Similar information flows can be tracked in Zhang Zhidong’s collected works,
which include over 1,000 outgoing or incoming telegrams for an eight-week
period in 1900 (May 28–July 25). Lateral communications were the most
numerous. There are over 600 outgoing telegrams, with some going to multiple
addressees. For example, 29 telegrams were sent to three or more province-level
officials outside Hubei and Hunan. In this two-month period Zhang sent 66
telegrams to Liu Kunyi, 36 to Sheng Xuanhuai, and 15 to Li Hongzhang, from
whom he received 9. In total, there are 285 incoming telegrams, mostly from
82
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Zhang’s fellow officials. 83 Zhang not only was instrumental in the “group
telegrams” that he, Li, and others sent to Beijing, he was also mindful of keeping
key provincial officials as well informed as possible.
In Zhang Zhidong’s collected works we can also see one of the most
remarkable demonstrations of the viability of China’s hybrid communications
network. On one day—June 22, 1900 (GX26/5/26)—at the beginning of the
crisis, in a masterful display of the communications tools available to a late-Qing
official in the new age of telegraphy, Zhang sent out three telegrams, one to his
local officials, one a collegial lateral communication to other provincial officials,
and one a Zongli Yamen-type message to Chinese ministers serving in key
diplomatic posts around the world. Zhang required replies from his local officials;
he also received timely responses from his colleagues, and from the Chinese
ministers abroad.
Zhang directed his local officials in Hubei and Hunan to immediately post the
sixteen characters of an imperial edict that he wanted distributed as a provincial
proclamation. He even specified the seven characters that should appear at the
top: “A Proclamation of the Yamens of the Governor-General and the Governor.”
The edict Zhang wanted everyone to know about cautioned against disturbing the
peace and harming [Chinese] Christians, and that the death penalty could be used
as a punishment. Telegraphy would take the message as far as possible; then the
dispatch of the provincial proclamation would use non-telegraphic means.84
To Chinese ministers stationed abroad in London, Washington, and Tokyo,
Zhang telegraphed a detailed report on recent events that he asked the legation
staffs to translate and deliver, along with the Chinese version, to the respective
foreign offices. Zhang, who said he was speaking on behalf of all provincial
officials,85 none of whom he said had received an imperial edict to commence
war, wanted foreign governments to know that Li Hongzhang had been
summoned by a Qing court, with peaceful intentions, to mediate. Zhang called on
Great Britain, Japan, and the United States to temporarily halt military
actions—he knew the Dagu Forts had already been taken—in North China. He
promised that, if a cease fire held, provincial officials along the Yangzi would be
able to keep the peace. But if hostilities resumed in Tianjin, Zhang warned, the
situation in the south could become much more dangerous.86 Responses from
various legations ministers to this or similar telegrams reached Zhang Zhidong’s
yamen within a week.87
83
84
85
86
87

Zhang, Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 10, 7958–8177, 8180.
Ibid., 8014–15.
Ibid., 8018.
Ibid., 8017 (GX26/5/26 fa).
Ibid., 8031–34 for GX26/5/30-26/6/3 (26 June–29 June).

420

Roger R. Thompson

Finally, we can assess a series of lateral telegrams that were a hallmark of
Zhang’s communications strategy during the crisis. Zhang reached out to his
fellow governors in Guangdong, Jiangsu, Fujian, Sichuan, Zhejiang, Anhui,
Jiangxi, Hunan, and Shandong with a report of what had been sent abroad. It is
unclear which of these officials had signed off on the original group report.
Within four days Zhang had responses from seven of the ten recipients.88
Like Li Hongzhang’s and Zhang Zhidong’s, the collected works of Liu Kunyi
and Sheng Xuanhuai also include extensive compilations of lateral
communications.89 This phenomenon of timely lateral provincial communications
made possible by a telegraph network centered in Shanghai would become a
feature of twentieth-century China.
Westerners, most of whom had little understanding of the palace-memorial
system, and who had virtually no information about the ongoing communications
between Beijing and its provincial officials, projected upon the “Southern
Governors” a legitimacy that came at the expense of the court and its officials in
Beijing. The “Southern Governors,” who were still in close contact with the court
in Beijing, and mindful of its needs and demands, were of like mind with
Western consuls in Shanghai to limit the fighting, it at all possible, to the north.
Because Shanghai and the rest of the telegraph network were not cut, the
dynamic of confusion and chaos so characteristic of Beijing and the north was
not repeated in central and south China. Western capitals, and Chinese officials in
these parts of China, were both better informed of, and more in control of,
events.
The disaster of the Boxer Uprising, by making the infrastructure visible as it
was breaking down, also alerts us to the importance of understanding and
assessing the significance of the repair and transformation of China’s telegraphic
network during and after the Boxer Uprising. The telegraph lines in Beijing and
across North China that were cut in 1900 were repaired, but in the final fifteen
months of Li Hongzhang’s life the telegraphic sovereignty he had sought to
ensure for China was severely compromised. As the armies of Western nations
and Japan occupied North China and Manchuria, one of the first actions they
took was to secure lines of communications, a term that included telegraph lines.
Western military forces immediately began stringing their own North China
telegraph network in the summer of 1900. An Anglo-American military landline
was strung between the Dagu Forts on the coast and Beijing by August 22.
Several Western powers also realized dreams long thwarted by the Chinese:
88
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landing submarine cables along the China coast. As discussed earlier, in 1883 the
Qing had gained control of the illegal cable the Great Northern Telegraph
Company had landed at Shanghai in 1870. In 1883 the British Eastern Extension
Australasia and China Telegraph Company had been allowed to land a cable at
Shanghai on the same terms granted the Danish company, and both of these
companies, in concert with ITA, established lucrative revenue-sharing business
practices that were monopolistic as the century drew to a close.90 The United
States, Germany, and France, however, still lacked cables to Asia. The United
States, for one, had made clear to officials at the Zongli Yamen as early as 1881
that a Pacific cable to China was of great interest. The American Minister to
China, James B. Angell, in a June 13 meeting with Wang Wenshao and other
Zongli Yamen officials said: “It is highly probable that before long American
citizens will desire to lay a cable from San Francisco to the Hawaiian Islands,
and thence to China. Such a line will be a great advantage to you as well as to
us.”91 Angell claimed that Wang, who took the lead in this discussion, “did not
see why other nations should be denied” the right to land cables in China.92
Almost two decades later little had changed, but in the aftermath of the
Spanish-American War telegraphy in East Asia came to be seen by the Great
Powers as it had been in China, a matter of strategic military significance. In
1898 Germany had yearned for a submarine cable connection between its new
Qingdao colony in Shandong and Shanghai. 93 On November 21, 1898, the
German minister threatened, in a communication to the Zongli Yamen, to lead a
multi-national effort to lay a submarine cable from Tianjin to Shanghai via
Qingdao unless Sheng Xuanhuai’s Imperial Telegraph Administration started
delivering a more reliable north-south telegraph service.94 In 1899 British naval
authorities had expressed interest to the British Foreign Office in a submarine
cable between Britain’s new Weihaiwei concession in northern Shandong and
Shanghai in an October 11, 1899 memo, stating that “direct reliable telegraphic
communication with Weihaiwei... is of supreme strategical importance.” 95
Moreover, cables to Asia became seen as markers of colonial power and
prestige.96
One of the underappreciated casualties of the Boxer Uprising was the loss of
China’s telegraphic sovereignty with respect to submarine cables. At the same
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time that an Anglo-American landline was being strung between the Dagu forts
and Beijing in August 1900, a submarine cable was laid that connected Dagu to
Yantai (Chefoo) in northern Shandong, where it connected to a still-functioning
line in China’s domestic network. In addition to this link to Shanghai, the foreign
community also had access to a submarine cable from Yantai to Shanghai that
was completed by September 17. Branch cables had already been laid, so this
Yantai-Shanghai line also connected via branch cables to landings in southern
Manchuria and Shandong. Britain had added a submarine cable from Weihaiwei
to this Yantai-Shanghai cable, on September 5, and thus added a critical link in
its “all-red” network; Russia’s cable between Yantai and Port Arthur was
completed on September 3; Germany realized its goal of a submarine cable
between Qingdao and Shanghai by December; it had also landed a
Yantai-Qingdao cable. According to the terms of agreements, signed by Sheng
Xuanhuai on August 4, 1900 and September 27, 1900, management and
supervision of these and other cables, including operation of stations, would be in
the hands of foreigners until peace returned to China. 97 As long as the
negotiations for the Boxer Protocol continued, Westerners controlled some key
parts of China’s telegraph network.
China was able to reclaim some of its telegraphic sovereignty after the
protocol was signed in September 1901. It quickly nationalized the Imperial
Telegraph Administration in 1902, a goal that was achieved in 1908.98 On
January 30, 1911 (XT3/1/1/) the General Telegraph Administration Bureau of the
Ministry of Posts and Communications (Youchuan bu dianzheng zongju) took
over managerial responsibilities of eleven provincial-level administrations.99 But
other aspects of a diminished telegraphic sovereignty, including the Western and
Japanese right to protect certain lines of communication in North China, were not
regained for some time. In 1911–12, as another threat of widespread disorder
appeared imminent, foreign troops quickly moved to secure the
Beijing-Tianjin-Tanggu line of communication under the rights and privileges
97
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established by Article 9 in the Boxer Protocol of September 1901.100 Almost
forty years would pass before the People’s Republic of China regained all of the
telegraphic sovereignty lost in the chaos and violence of 1900–1901.

Conclusion
This study of the materiality of China’s strategic telegraph network as the
nineteenth century drew to a close adds to our understanding of late-Qing history
and its connections to regional and global histories. While high profile defeats in
1894–95 and 1900 grab attention and influence interpretations, we have assessed
new evidence of state capacity and Qing governmentality that can be found in the
history of China’s telegraph network.
This is just a start. It is one thing to know that information flows between
Beijing and the provinces were slowed, but certainly neither diminished nor
stopped, during the summer of 1900. The functioning of China’s information
infrastructure, at the very least, should make us wonder about Western claims
about the collapse of central government authority and legitimacy. When we can
add to this network analysis a more detailed knowledge of the content of the
messages, we will have taken an important step toward realizing Siege survivor
Robert Hart’s hope for an account, still only partially written, of what was
happening inside the Forbidden City in the summer of 1900. Sources like the
Grand Council’s Suishou dengji, now available outside China, make such a
project feasible.
But we need also to take a step back from 1900 and look again at the Qing
dynasty in the post-1860 period. Three developments, one every ten years,
transformed the communications infrastructure of Qing China and the
relationship of China with the West. In some respects Qing governmentality was
enhanced. In 1861 the Zongli Yamen was established and the West, for the first
time, had access to an office whose specific responsibility was to deal with the
West and things Western. The importance of the office was indicated by the
stature and reputation of its members, and its relationship to the Grand Council.
Ten years later, in 1871, China was connected to the international telegraph
network. Now Western envoys in Beijing could communicate with their home
governments in days, not weeks. And finally, at the end of 1881, the line from
Shanghai to Tianjin drew envoys even closer to Europe and America. At the same
time, as we have seen, Beijing began to draw closer to its provincial officials, and
100
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provincial officials closer to one another.
Many topics in late-Qing history need to be reassessed in light of this
knowledge. And, as we have seen, this new communications infrastructure could
integrate and destabilize China itself, as well as improve and complicate
Sino-Western relations.
From the perspective of the early twenty-first century, we can see that the
disaster of 1900–1901 was a passing one: Li Hongzhang’s goal of a China with
telegraphic sovereignty was realized once again. But the paradoxes of China’s
strategic networking remain, especially the paradox of modern communications
capacity for both integration and disintegration at both the levels of regions and
between persons. Finally, the progress of the communications revolution that
played out in China, as it did elsewhere, still confronts us as it continues to the
present, with unintended consequences. As we widen our gaze from state to
society, it is clear that the adoption of new technologies always possesses a
material reality and a materiality. It is the latter element, a technology’s
materiality that takes us beyond the marvel, the object, and forces us to focus on
the agency of its human users and the consequences, intended or otherwise, of its
use. Then, as now, China can serve as a laboratory of the new as we confront and
transform the familiar.
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